A. **Right to Inspect Records**

GP § 4-103(a) provides that “[a]ll persons are entitled to have access to information about the affairs of government and the official acts of public officials and employees.” The right is made clear in GP § 4-201(a)(1), which states that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, a custodian shall permit a person or governmental unit to inspect any public record at any reasonable time.” Inspection or copying of a public record may be denied only to the extent permitted under the PIA. GP § 4-201(a)(2).

The PIA grants a broad right of inspection to “any person.” The term “person,” defined in GP § 1-114, extends to entities as well as individuals. A person need not show that he or she is “aggrieved” or a “person in interest.” *Superintendent v. Henschen*, 279 Md. 468, 473 (1977). Nor is access restricted to citizens or residents of Maryland. *Cf. McBurney v. Young*, 569 U.S. 221, 224 (2013) (holding that provision of Virginia FOIA law limiting access to Virginia citizens did not violate federal Constitution). In most cases, a person need not justify or otherwise explain a request to inspect records, and a custodian of records may not require a person to say who they are or why they want the records as a prerequisite to responding to a request. GP § 4-204. Nor may a custodian ignore a request on the grounds that it was made for the purpose of harassment. GP § 4-203(c)(2).

In some instances, the PIA provides a “person in interest” with a greater right of access to a particular type of record than that available to other requesters. In these instances, the custodian must determine whether the requester is a “person in interest.” Such special rights of access apply to the following types of records or information: promotional examination records (GP § 4-345(b)), information about a person’s finances (GP § 4-336(c)), higher education investment contracts (GP § 4-314(b)), information relating to notaries (GP § 4-332(d)), licensing information (GP §§ 4-333(d) and 4-334(b)), medical or psychological information (GP § 3-229(c)), personnel records (GP § 4-311(b)), records pertaining to investigations (GP § 4-351(b)), retirement
records (GP § 4-312(b)), student records (GP § 4-313(b)), records concerning persons with alarm or security systems (GP § 4-339(b)), and records with identifying information concerning enrollees at senior centers (GP § 4-340(c)).

The term “person in interest” is defined generally by GP § 4-101(g) as the subject of the record or, in some cases, that person’s representative. Cases construing the term “person in interest” within the investigatory records context have limited it to the person that is being investigated and have not extended it to either the complainant or the person performing the investigation. See Maryland Dep’t of State Police v. Dashiell, 443 Md. 435, 461-63 (2015) (person making the complaint that triggered internal investigation is not a “person in interest”); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Maryland Committee Against the Gun Ban, 329 Md. 78, 90 (1993) (political committee that was served with a subpoena was not a “person in interest” in connection with records relating to a Baltimore City Police Department Internal Affairs investigation; the officers who served the subpoena were the subject of the investigation and were thus the “persons in interest”); see also 71 Opinions of the Attorney General 297, 302 (1986) (with respect to a tape recording of a hearing involving involuntary admission of a patient to State mental health facility, “the person in interest” is the patient or the patient’s representative, not the staff who participated in the hearing).

The term “person in interest” includes the “designee” of the person who is the subject of the record. GP § 4-101(g). While the statute does not state how an individual is identified as a “designee,” agencies may find it useful to require affirmation from the person who is the subject of the record when access to the record is otherwise limited. Letter of Assistant Attorney General Bonnie A. Kirkland to Delegate Kevin Kelly (April 14, 2004). If a “person in interest” has a legal disability, then that individual’s parent or legal representative may act on the individual’s behalf as a “person in interest.” GP § 4-101(g)(2). However, a parent whose parental rights have been terminated with respect to a child may not act as a “person in interest” on the child’s behalf. 90 Opinions of the Attorney General 45, 58-59 (2005).

While a custodian generally cannot require a requester to explain the purpose for which the requester wants the records as a prerequisite to responding to a PIA request, the requester’s intended use may be an appropriate subject of discussion in certain circumstances. For example, a requester who wishes to convince a custodian that it is “in the public interest” for the requester to waive a fee under GP § 4-206(e) or to release records covered by one of the discretionary exceptions in Part IV may choose
to explain the purpose underlying the request. See pp. 3-33 and 7-5 below. The use to which the requester intends to put the requested information may also be relevant in an action for a protective order brought under GP § 4-358. See Glenn v. Maryland Dept of Health & Mental Hygiene, 446 Md. 378, 386-89 (2016); Howard v. Alexanderson, Nos. C-13-063914, C-13-063484 (Cir. Ct. Carroll County Jan. 16, 2014); p. 3-50 below.

An agency has no obligation to create records to satisfy a PIA request. For example, if a request is made for the report of a consultant and the consultant did not issue a written report, the PIA does not require that a written report be created in order to satisfy the request.

Whether or not an agency response would involve the creation of a “new record” has sometimes arisen in the context of electronic records. For example, if an agency maintains certain records in an electronic database and a PIA request seeks a subset of that database or the generation of a report from the database, is the request seeking access to existing records—required by the PIA—or seeking the creation of a “new record”—not required by the PIA?

The General Assembly addressed this question in 2011 legislation concerning access to electronic records under the PIA. 2011 Md. Laws, ch. 536; see Chapter 6, below. In a provision obligating a custodian of records to provide a copy of an electronic record in a “searchable and analyzable electronic format,” the General Assembly indicated that the custodian was not required to “create, compile, or program a new public record.” GP § 4-205(c)(4)(iii). That 2011 law also provided that, “if a public record exists in a searchable and analyzable electronic format, the act of a custodian providing a portion of the public record in a searchable and analyzable electronic format does not constitute creating a new public record.” GP § 4-205(c)(5). Application of this provision will depend on the nature and characteristics of particular databases, but generally speaking, an agency is obligated to extract data from an existing database if it has the capacity to do so “within [its] existing functionality and in the normal course.” Comptroller of the Treasury v. Immanuel, 216 Md. App. 259, 271 (2014), aff’d 449 Md. 76 (2016).

So an agency should comply with a request if it has staff available who routinely perform the type of data extraction requested, but the agency need not do so if that task would call for expertise outside the agency’s existing capabilities. Nor must the agency
comply with requests that call for it to generate new data or to analyze or summarize data. See id. at 270-71 (requiring Comptroller to extract data from database of unclaimed property in response to PIA request because request did “not require the Comptroller to generate new data, perform any analysis on existing data, or even to gather disparate pieces of information stored elsewhere into one new place”).

Sometimes a person will present an agency with a “standing request” which seeks production of a category of public records at regular intervals in the future as those records are created. Although an agency may honor such a request, the agency is not required to commit itself to provide records that have not yet been created. See Letter of Assistant Attorney General Jack Schwartz to Mark M. Viani, Associate County Attorney, Calvert County (May 22, 1998).

Of course, records that no longer exist cannot be examined. Prince George’s County v. Washington Post Co., 149 Md. App. 289, 323 (2003). However, a custodian should not destroy records to avoid compliance with a pending request or in a manner contrary to the agency’s record retention schedule.

**B. Government Agency’s Access to Records**

The PIA generally regulates the access of one government agency to the records of another. A governmental unit is specifically given the right to inspect certain public records in GP §§ 4-103(b), 4-201(a), and 4-202(a) and is given the right to appeal a denial of inspection by GP § 4-362. Thus, when a request for inspection of records is made to a State agency by another State agency, a federal agency, or a local government entity, the custodian should consider the effect of the PIA. See Prince George’s County v. Maryland Comm’n on Hum. Rels., 40 Md. App. 473, 484-85 (1978), vacated on other grounds, 285 Md. 205 (1979); 81 Opinions of the Attorney General 164, 167 (1996); see also 86 Opinions of the Attorney General 94, 108-09 (2001). In some instances, though, a government agency might implicitly have access to records that the PIA otherwise protects in order to fulfill a statutory duty given to it by the Legislature. See, e.g., 86 Opinions of the Attorney General at 108-09 (although an agency may not generally share personnel records with other agencies under what is now GP § 4-311, an agency charged with responsibilities related to personnel administration may implicitly have access to those records to the extent necessary to carry out its duties). In addition, the agencies involved should consider whether another law governs the matter of interagency access. For example, requests for access to records by the Legislative
Auditor in connection with an audit are not governed by the PIA. 76 Opinions of the Attorney General 287, 288, 290-94 (1991). If the other law limits access to records, the requesting agency has no greater access under the PIA, as the PIA defers to other law. 92 Opinions of the Attorney General 137, 145-47 (2007).

C. Scope of Search

The PIA does not address the issue of the adequacy of the agency’s search for records. Guidance may be found, however, in the case law under FOIA. “As is the case under . . . FOIA, the adequacy of the agency’s search is measured by whether it is reasonably calculated to uncover responsive records, not by whether it locates every possible responsive record.” Glass v. Anne Arundel County, 453 Md. 201, 212 (2017); see also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 1241, 1246-47 (4th Cir. 1994); Neighborhood Alliance of Spokane County v. Spokane County, 261 P.3d 119, 127-28 (Wash. 2011) (applying FOIA standard in absence of analogous provision of state law).

Under this standard, agencies may be required to conduct relatively broad and time-consuming searches. See, e.g., Ruotolo v. Dep’t of Justice, 53 F.3d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1995) (onus is on the agency to demonstrate that a search would be unduly burdensome, and this obligation is met only in cases involving truly massive volumes of records). However, “[t]his does not mean that the agency must robotically examine every record in its possession, running up an extravagant fee and diverting public resources in furtherance of a futile effort; rather, the search should be focused on where responsive records are likely to be found.” Glass, 453 Md. at 232. Moreover, an agency need not “hire a computer expert and conduct a forensic examination of its information systems to recover deleted electronic records that may be contained in computer backup files in order to respond to a PIA request.” Id. at 236 n.32; see also CareToLive v. Food and Drug Administration, 631 F.3d 336, 343-44 (6th Cir. 2011). Instead, “[i]f the agency is able—and does—access the particular records for its own purposes without extraordinary expense, it is not unreasonable for the agency to cause a similar search of those records when such a search is likely to yield records responsive to a particular PIA request.” Glass, 453 Md. at 236 n.32. As summarized by the Court of Appeals:

In the end, what the PIA requires is a reasonable search designed to locate all records responsive to the particular PIA request, not a perfect search that leaves no stone unturned. Reasonableness must
be measured against the specificity of the request and the willingness of the requestor to focus a request to improve the efficiency of the search. An agency is not expected to divert its resources to an exhaustive search in response to a broadly worded request that the requestor refuses to focus and at an expense that will not be recovered.

*Id.* at 233.

Because broadly worded or otherwise burdensome requests may stem from a requestor’s lack of knowledge about what records an agency keeps or how it keeps them, it is often beneficial for the agency to assist the requestor in refining a request based on the type and scope of potentially responsive agency records. “In practice, a productive response to a PIA request is often an iterative process in which the agency reports on the type and scope of the files it holds that may include responsive records, and the requestor refines the request to reduce the labor (and expense) of searching those records.” *Id.* According to the Court of Appeals, “[w]hen the requestor and agency work together, the process approximates the purpose and policy of the PIA.” *Id.*